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INTRODUCTION
Much of the controversy surrounding the secret negotiation of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) centered on the
possibility that the agreement would oblige parties to adopt an online
copyright enforcement regime requiring Internet service providers
(“ISPs”) to terminate Internet access for accused repeat copyright
infringers.1 This regime, called “graduated response” or “three
strikes,” is at the forefront of an international lobbying campaign
being waged by corporate copyright holders and the trade
organizations that represent their interests to governments throughout
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. The
author would like to thank Michael Geist and Peter Yu for their helpful comments
and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. The author would also like to
thank Sean Flynn and the Program in Information Justice and Intellectual Property
at American University for precipitating a very necessary public discussion on the
public interest implications of ACTA.
1. E.g., Peter Sayer, Secret ACTA Draft Leaked After Washington Talks,
COMPUTERWORLD (Sep. 7, 2010), http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/
secret-acta-draft-leaked-after-washington-talks (identifying concerns that ACTA
may require adopting a system of identifying, warning, and disconnecting
subscribers accused of copyright infringement).
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the world.2 Groups like the International Federation for the
Phonographic Industry (“IFPI”) and the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (“IIPA”) have been especially aggressive in
pressuring individual governments to require ISPs to take an active
role in policing copyrights online by implementing graduated
response protocols.3 Several countries, including the U.K., France,
South Korea, and Taiwan, have already incorporated graduated
response into their respective domestic copyright enforcement
systems.4 Similar legislation is on its way to becoming the law in
New Zealand,5 although European Union (“E.U.”) countries
2. See For Students Doing Reports, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N AM.,
http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (noting that the Recording
Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) stopped its campaign to bring lawsuits
against individual infringers in favor of seeking agreements with ISPs “on a
graduated response program for repeat offenders”).
3. See IFPI’s Mission, INT’L FED’N FOR PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY [IFPI],
http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_about/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(indicating that IFPI’s key areas of work include anti-piracy enforcement and
government lobbying); Description of the IIPA, INT’L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE
[IIPA], http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing
IIPA’s international work as focused on improving protection and enforcement of
copyrighted materials).
4. See Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online
Copyright Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49
JURIMETRICS J. 375, 393-96 (2009) (noting that France’s graduated response
regime entailed the creation of HADOPI, a specialized governmental entity
addressing Internet-based copyright infringement, and that South Korea imposed
“active-preventative obligations on communications intermediaries”); Yu-Tzu
Chiu, Taiwan Adopts ‘Three Strikes’ Approach to Online Copyright Enforcement,
77 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 715 (2009) (reporting on the adoption of
graduated response by Taiwan’s parliament). The mandate in the U.K. is set forth
in the Digital Economy Act of 2010, which became law in April 2010. See Digital
Economy Act, 2010, c.24 §§ 3-18 (U.K.) (codifying notification and reporting
obligations and responsibilities regarding online copyright infringement); see also
id. c. 24, ¶ 33, Explanatory Notes (explaining that under the new U.K. law, the
Secretary of State may phase in additional technical measures, including protocols
for temporary Internet disconnection and bandwidth capping or shaping, if the
notice regime set forth in the legislation proves inadequate to reduce the level of
online infringement).
5. See Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill 2010 §§ 122B122R (N.Z.) (proposing to amend the Copyright Act of 1994 to provide new
enforcement measures against the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted material
over the Internet). As it was in France, the path to mandatory graduated response in
New Zealand is proving to be a rocky one. See, e.g., Pat Pilcher, So Long Section
92A - New Copyright Bill Revealed, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 24, 2010,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c_id=5&objectid=106281
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including Germany and Spain have notably declined to enact such
measures.6
In the countries that have enacted them, graduated response
mandates do not derive from existing international treaty obligations,
and it is now clear, based on the final text of ACTA, which was
released following the eleventh and final round of negotiations in
Tokyo, Japan, that such mandates will not be part of the agreement.7
This is, of course, good news for consumer advocates, who
legitimately worry that three strikes protocols put too much power in
the hands of corporate copyright holders and, among other
shortcomings, fail to accommodate fair use/fair dealing exceptions
that are built-in to most domestic copyright regimes. The omission of
mandatory graduated response from the final text of ACTA should
not, however, be taken as a definitive sign that the entertainment
industries have failed in their concerted effort to globalize graduated
response. On the contrary, ACTA in its final form both
accommodates existing graduated response mandates and requires
parties to promote the development of voluntary graduated response
regimes in countries where mandates do not exist.8

93 (noting the controversy surrounding the implementation of graduated response
in New Zealand, including the repeal of Section 92A of the Copyright Act, and the
introduction of more user-friendly legislation in the form of the Copyright
(Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill).
6. See Jacqui Cheng, Germany Says "Nein" To Three-Strikes Infringement
Plan, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 6, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/02/germany-walks-away-from-three-strikes-internet-policy.ars
(explaining the German government’s decision that graduated response would be
too invasive and would potentially conflict with domestic privacy laws); Howell
Llewellyn, ‘Three-Strikes’ Off Anti-Piracy Agenda In Spain, BILLBOARD.BIZ (June
22,
2009),
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3i807
1e0d9c25cb6b876d3771fb7e3d102 (reporting on the Spanish government’s refusal
to implement a graduated response scheme).
7. See generally Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010
[hereinafter ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/
trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf (lacking any provision
that would mandate adoption of graduated response).
8. See id. art. 27, ¶ 1 (ensuring the availability of “expeditious remedies to
prevent infringement and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements”); id. art. 27, ¶ 3 (requiring parties to “endeavor to promote
cooperative efforts within the business community” to curb copyright infringement
in the digital environment).
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I. THE (APPARENT) RETREAT FROM
GRADUATED RESPONSE
On April 16, 2010, at the conclusion of the eighth round of ACTA
negotiations in Wellington, New Zealand, the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (“USTR”) announced publicly in a press
release that “no participant is proposing to require governments to
mandate a ‘graduated response’ or ‘three strikes’ approach to
copyright infringement on the Internet.”9 The official draft text of
ACTA, released on April 21, 2010 (“the April draft”), confirmed that
mandatory graduated response was no longer on the table for the
negotiating parties by the end of the eighth round.10 What remained,
however, was a more general provision that conditioned ISP
eligibility for safe harbor from claims of third party infringement on
“an online service provider adopting and reasonably implementing a
policy . . . to address unauthorized storage or transmission of
materials protected by copyright.”11 Such a policy presumably might,
though it needn’t necessarily, entail graduated response.
Readers of the April draft who are familiar with U.S. copyright
law immediately recognized that the language of the proposed safe
harbor provision, which U.S. negotiators drafted, was strongly
evocative of section 512(i) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”)—the so-called repeat infringer provision.12 Section
512(i) requires ISPs seeking safe harbor to “adopt[] and reasonably
implement[] . . . a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the
service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.”13
The verbal affinities between the developing Internet provisions of

9. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative Releases Statement of ACTA Negotiating Partners on
Recent ACTA Negotiations (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pressoffice/press-releases/2010/april/office-us-trade-representative-releases-statementac.
10. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative
Draft, Apr. 21, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010], available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.
11. Id. art. 2.18, ¶ 3 (Option 1, (b)).
12. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
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ACTA and the DMCA’s repeat infringer provision were even more
evident in an earlier, leaked draft of the agreement, which contained
an explanatory footnote concerning the specific type of policy that
would satisfy the requirement: “An example of such a policy is
providing for the termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscriptions [and/or] accounts on the service provider’s system or
network of repeat infringers.”14 This footnote was conspicuously
absent from the April draft, as was any other reference to termination
of subscribers or account holders who are repeat infringers.
Unlike the previously leaked version of ACTA, the April draft
retreated entirely from the DMCA’s rhetoric of termination of
subscribers and account holders—a response, perhaps, to criticism
that ACTA’s Internet provisions were being crafted by industrycaptured U.S. negotiators to export the DMCA to the rest of the
world. Other elements strongly reminiscent of the DMCA remained,
however.15 For example, the April draft extended safe harbor to the
same types of providers covered by the DMCA and proposed a
notice-and-takedown regime similar in broad outline to the one in the
DMCA.16
There were competing proposals in the April draft concerning the
appropriate source of a takedown notice. One option required
14. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative
Draft, 28 n.29, Jan. 18, 2010, available at https://sites.google.com/site/iip
enforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated January 18, 2010”).
15. The similarities do not stop at section 512. In addition to the safe harbor
provisions for ISPs, the April draft contains, for example, provisions that prohibit
the circumvention of technological protection measures (e.g., digital rights
management or “DRM”) that control access to and copying of copyrighted works.
These provisions bear an unmistakable resemblance to section 1201 of the DMCA.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (prohibiting circumvention of “a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work”), with ACTA
Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 4 (requiring parties to establish
adequate protection and remedies to prevent the “unauthorized circumvention of
effective technological measures”).
16. Compare ACTA April Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3
(Option 1) (providing limitations on the scope of an online service provider’s
liability for infringing activity that might otherwise arise from “automatic technical
processes, and . . . referring or linking users to an online location”), with 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(a) (offering safe harbor for providers that route, transmit, and transiently
store infringing material, as long as those activities are carried out through “an
automated technical process”), and § 512(d) (establishing safe harbor for providers
that “refer[] or link[] users to an online location containing infringing material”).
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“legally sufficient notice of alleged infringement,” which presumably
could come from a rights holder, similar to notice deemed effective
under section 512(c) of the DMCA.17 Another option required
“receipt of an order from a competent authority,” which implies a
governmental source.18 The latter proposal suggests the necessity for
a disinterested official adjudication of some kind prior to any
enforcement action. No such safeguard is required by the DMCA
before content is taken down or, for that matter, before a user’s
account access is terminated by a provider pursuant to section
512(i).19 By contrast, a form of due process is required prior to the
imposition of access sanctions under the Internet Freedom Provision
of the 2009 E.U. Telecoms Reform.20 Due process is also a
component of Création et Internet, France’s graduated response law,
which (as amended) provides for judicial review of disconnection
decisions that are issued initially by HADOPI, the special
administrative entity created to implement the graduated response
system.21
17. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 (Option 2); 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (setting forth the elements of an effective notification of
alleged infringement, including the signature of the owner of the copyright in the
work or an authorized agent, identification of the copyrighted work, information
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the infringing work on
its system, and a statement of good faith).
18. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 (Option 2).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (indicating that policies and procedures for
terminating access for repeat infringers are established and implemented by service
providers without any governmental involvement).
20. The Internet Freedom Provision, Article 1(3)a of the new Framework
Directive, provides that sanctions involving Internet access must be “appropriate,
proportionate and necessary within a democratic society, and their implementation
shall be subject to adequate procedural safeguards . . . including effective judicial
protection and due process.” Press Release, Europa, EU Telecoms Reform: 12
Reforms to Pave Way for Stronger Consumer Rights, an Open Internet, a Single
European Telecoms Market and High-Speed Internet Connections for All Citizens
Annex 1 (Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?aged=0&format=HTML&guiLanguage=en&language=EN&reference=
MEMO/09/513. Under Article 1(3)a, Internet users are entitled to a presumption of
innocence and respect for their privacy rights in proceedings involving accusations
of copyright infringement. Id.
21. See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE arts. L. 331-27, 331-31 (Fr.)
(providing for judicial review of HADOPI decisions and sanctions); see also
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-590DC,
Oct. 22, 2009, Rec. 2-3 (Fr.) (holding that Article L. 331-21 is not unconstitutional,
as judicial authorities are required to make case by case determinations of alleged
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To ensure that statutory enforcement regimes like France’s would
not be disrupted or preempted by ACTA, there was a proposed
provision in the April draft—presented as an alternative to the U.S.drafted, DMCA-like notice-and-takedown provision—stipulating
that ACTA’s safe harbor provisions “shall not affect the possibility
for a judicial or administrative authority, in accordance with the
Parties [sic] legal system, requiring the service provider to terminate
or prevent an infringement.”22 The proposed language avoided any
reference to disconnection or termination of infringers, although the
phrase “terminate or prevent an infringement” could be read to
encompass termination of Internet access, pursuant to a
governmentally defined protocol, for repeat infringers.23
The commonalities between the April draft of ACTA and the
DMCA did not end at the definition of safe harbors for ISPs. The
April draft, like the DMCA, provided for the identification of alleged
infringers outside the litigation context.24 Like the DMCA, the April
draft attempted to respond to the concerns of ISPs and privacy
advocates by expressly excluding a general network monitoring or
policing requirement.25 In addition, the April draft contained antioffenses). The original version of the law, which did not provide for judicial
review, was struck down by France’s Constitutional Council. See Conseil
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-580, June 10, 2009
(Fr.) (holding provisions of the HADOPI statute unconstitutional for vesting
judicial powers in an administrative authority).
22. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 (Option 2).
23. Id. This alternate provision is very similar to the provision in the E.U.
Directive on Electronic Commerce concerning the availability of injunctive relief
against ISPs in cases involving online copyright infringement: “The limitations of
the liability of intermediary service providers . . . do not affect the possibility of . .
. orders by courts or administrative authorities requiring the termination or
prevention of any infringement.” European Parliament and Council Directive
2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 6 (EC).
24. Compare ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3
(allowing a copyright holder to obtain information from the service provider on the
identity of an allegedly infringing subscriber), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (allowing a
copyright holder to obtain a pre-litigation subpoena requiring a service provider to
release information identifying an alleged infringer).
25. Compare ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3
(Option 1) (providing that “no party may condition the limitations in subparagraph
(a) on the online service provider’s monitoring its services or affirmatively seeking
facts indicating that infringing activity is occurring”), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)
(providing that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to condition the
applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on . . . a service provider monitoring its

566

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:3

circumvention provisions similar to those found in section 1201 of
the DMCA, including section 1201’s controversial anti-trafficking
provisions, which ban the dissemination of technologies for
circumventing technological protection measures employed by rights
holders.26 With respect to the proposed anti-circumvention
provisions, however, there was a footnote in the April draft
indicating a lack of consensus on the issue among negotiators.27
The official release of the April draft, coming at the close of the
eighth round of negotiations in Wellington, confirmed for the public
at large what was being reported by commentators close to the
process: As the parties entered the ninth round of negotiations in
Lucerne, Switzerland, the provisions of the Internet chapter, even
stripped of references to account termination for repeat infringers,
remained divisive, and consensus on the DMCA-like secondary
liability and anti-circumvention provisions was proving elusive.28
This was true in no small part because the imposition of secondary
liability required by provisions in the April draft would have
represented a change in substantive intellectual property law for
some parties.29 The April draft thus demonstrated ACTA’s potential
to function as a back door for policymaking through which more
service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity”).
26. Compare ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 4
(requiring “adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors”), with
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (providing that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to” a protected work).
27. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, at 22 n.59 (stating that “[a]t
least one delegation has reservations about several elements” of the proposed
terms).
28. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, ACTA Arrives (Still Bad, but a Tiny Bit Better),
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/
04/acta-is-here.ars/3 (discussing the international climate for ACTA on the eve of
the Luzerne round).
29. See Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for
Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 251-52 (2008)
(noting that “[t]he considerable diversity in global thought on the issue of
secondary liability for intellectual property rights infringement highlights the
important fact that not all participants in discussion of this topic start from the
same place in terms of legal theory and practice”); Has the US Caved on
Secondary Liability in ACTA?, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5273/125/ (indicating that secondary
liability was a sticking point in the negotiations because countries have different
domestic approaches to the issue).
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expansive substantive rights were sneaking in under the guise of
better-coordinated enforcement.30
Given the persistence of the parties’ disagreement over the scope
and substance of the Internet provisions, and considering the United
States’ publicly stated goal of concluding the agreement
expeditiously, the most controversial elements of the Internet chapter
were excised by the end of the tenth round of negotiations in
Washington, D.C.31 The August 2010 draft of ACTA, leaked at the
close of the round, dispensed with the consensus-thwarting
secondary liability provisions from earlier drafts, along with the safe
harbor framework designed to mitigate their impact on ISPs.32 A
contemporaneous USTR press release, asserting that ACTA “is not
intended to include new intellectual property rights or to

30. But cf. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 1.3, ¶ 1 (“This
Agreement shall be without prejudice to provisions governing the availability,
acquisition, scope, and maintenance of intellectual property rights contained in a
Party’s law.”). Commentators have pointed out, however, that many of the
provisions proposed in the April draft do affect substantive rights. E.g., Press
Release, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual
Prop. (PIJIP), Text of Urgent ACTA Communiqué: International Experts Find that
Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests (June 23,
2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique
(“What started as a relatively simple proposal to coordinate customs enforcement
has transformed into a sweeping and complex new international intellectual
property and internet regulation with grave consequences for the global economy
and governments’ ability to promote and protect the public interest.”).
31. See Doug Palmer, U.S. — EU Food Fight Dogs Anti-Counterfeiting Talks,
REUTERS, (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/18/us-tradecounterfeiting-idUSTRE67H5M420100818 (reporting that the United States hopes
that the differences between the negotiating countries regarding ACTA’s scope can
be resolved quickly so that the agreement can move closer to implementation).
32. What remained was a general provision requiring that “[e]ach party’s
enforcement procedures shall provide the means to address the infringement of
{US: copyright or related rights}{EU/J: intellectual property rights[}] in the digital
environment, including infringement that occurs via technologies [US: or services]
that can be used to facilitate widespread infringement.” ACTA Consolidated Text:
Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, art. 2.18, ¶ 2, Aug. 25, 2010 [hereinafter
ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010], available at https://sites.google.com/site/
iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated August 25, 2010”). A
footnote singled out unlawful file sharing and unlawful streaming as examples of
such technologies or services that can be used in widespread infringement. Id. at
19 n.29. Also included in the new provision was a mandate to implement the
procedures “in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate activity.”
Id. art. 2.18, ¶ 2.
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enlarge. . .existing intellectual property rights,”33 hinted at the
impetus for the changes.
However, not all of the controversial DMCA-like provisions were
eliminated by the end of the tenth round. Still in the mix going into
the eleventh (and final) round of negotiations in Tokyo were
controversial provisions concerning anti-circumvention34 and ISP
identification of alleged online infringers.35 The proposed anticircumvention provisions continued to include a requirement, backed
by the United States but opposed by the E.U., that violations be
actionable even without any nexus to copyright infringement.36
By the time negotiations entered the final round, in September
2010, it was apparent to those following the process and comparing
successive drafts of ACTA that U.S. aspirations for very aggressive
Internet and intermediary liability provisions had been incrementally
disappointed.37 The language of the agreement with respect to the
digital environment had evolved, as a result of pressure from both
within and outside the formal process, to be more protective of the
parties’ sovereign prerogatives in areas relating to substantive rights,
33. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of
ACTA Negotiating Partners on Recent ACTA Negotiations (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/august.
34. Compare ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 4 (“Each
Party shall provide for adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies . . .
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by
authors.”), with ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 32, art. 2.18, ¶¶ 5-6
(“Each party shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies
against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by . . .
authors.”).
35. In the August 2010 leaked text, however, the provision was no longer
mandatory. Compare ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 ter
(providing that “[e]ach party shall enable right holders . . . to expeditiously obtain
from [an online service provider] information on the identity of [an allegedly
infringing] subscriber”), with ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 32, art.
2.18, ¶ 4 (stating that “each Party may provide. . . that its competent authorities
have the authority to order an online service provider to disclose” information
about alleged infringers).
36. ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 32, art. 2.18, ¶ 7.
37. See Sarah Lai Stirland, ACTA: International Trade Negotiators Drop ISP
Liability, Anti-Circumvention Provisions Still In, BROADBAND BREAKFAST (Sept.
7,
2010),
http://broadbandbreakfast.com/2010/09/acta-international-tradenegotiators-drop-isp-liability-anti-circumvention-provisions-still-in/ (noting that
the August Draft of ACTA included watered-down, broad language on
intermediary liability).
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liabilities, and exceptions.38 The final text of the agreement, released
officially after the Tokyo round, provides further evidence of this
trend insofar as it altogether omits the U.S.-backed provision
requiring parties to make circumventions actionable per se.39

II. THE (ACTUAL) PERSISTENCE OF GRADUATED
RESPONSE
Although the absence of any reference to repeat infringers in both
the April draft and the final version of ACTA may give the
impression that graduated response is not part of the enforcement
framework contemplated by the agreement, this is only superficially
true. The April draft contained an allusive provision requiring
signatories to pressure ISPs to cooperate with rights holders:
Each party shall promote the development of mutually supportive
relationships between online service providers and rights holders to deal
effectively with. . .copyright and related rights infringement which takes
place by means of the Internet, including the encouragement of
establishing guidelines for the actions which should be taken.40

This mandatory provision remains—albeit in qualified form—in
the final version:
Each party shall endeavor to promote cooperative efforts within the
business community to effectively address trademark and copyright or
related rights infringement while preserving legitimate competition and,
consistent with each Party’s law, preserving fundamental principles such
as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy.41

Moreover, in the final version, a statement concerning ISP
cooperation with rights holders appears in the agreement’s preamble:
The Parties to this Agreement . . . [d]esiring to promote cooperation
38. See id. (indicating that technology companies and digital rights groups
were concerned about ACTA’s digital environment provisions and that the August
draft seemed to address such concerns by including language allowing for the
adoption of exceptions and limitations to anti-circumvention).
39. Compare ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 32, art. 2.18, ¶ 7
(mandating anti-circumvention measures independent of copyright infringement),
with ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 7, art. 27, ¶ 6 (lacking this August
2010 draft provision).
40. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 quater.
41. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 7, art. 27, ¶ 3.
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between service providers and right holders to address relevant
infringements in the digital environment . . . [h]ereby agree as
follows . . . .42

Positioned as it is at the beginning of the agreement, this statement
foregrounds the principle on which graduated response is founded:
ISPs and rights holders should be collaborating more closely in the
project of online copyright enforcement.
The notion that ISPs should be encouraged by governments to
work with rights holders is reminiscent of the DMCA, which was
drafted, according to the statute’s legislative history, to “preserve[]
strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to
cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take
place in the digital networked environment.”43 The formalization of
such cooperative relationships appears on the IIPA’s 2010 global
copyright policy wish list: “The copyright industries look to
governments to . . . [e]ncourage cooperation by Internet service
providers with all content owners, including workable and fair notice
and takedown systems and graduated response mechanisms to deal
with repeat infringers.”44
Even though ACTA does not mandate graduated response or
require disconnection for repeat infringers, and even though the final
version of the agreement does not contain a notice and takedown
provision, the language requiring governments to take affirmative
action to “promote cooperation” between rights holders and ISPs
resonates strongly with the copyright industries’ demand that ISPs
become more active in fighting piracy. The industries’ international
strategy with respect to graduated response is to seek government
mandates where such mandates seem politically achievable, and to
accept government pressure where mandates prove too politically
controversial. This strategy of compelled “voluntary” collaboration
comes directly from the playbook of the IFPI, which advocates
“government-backed systems of ISP cooperation” and asserts that
“government pressure is crucial to producing collective action by all
42. Id. pmbl.
43. H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
44. IIPA, Copyright Industries’ Global Challenges and Solutions for 2010:
Reduce Copyright Piracy, Remove Market Access Barriers, Strengthen Laws
(2010), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2010Special301Challenges.pdf.
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ISPs.”45
Consistent with the IIPA’s and the IFPI’s rhetoric, rights holders
increasingly are defining “mutually supportive relationships” and
“cooperation” between themselves and ISPs in terms of ISPs’
willingness to embrace graduated response.46 This is so much the
case that “cooperation” for the copyright industries now functions as
a sort of code word for graduated response.47 By requiring parties to
“endeavor to promote cooperative efforts within the business
community,” ACTA in its final form retains an implicit, sub-textual
appeal for global graduated response.48
These cooperative relationships are now developing in many
places through market forces and, in fact, without government
pressure—thereby casting doubt on the need for a provision in
ACTA requiring official pressure.49 A propos of this development,
opponents of graduated response should be mindful that public
law—whether international or domestic—is not the only vehicle
through which graduated response regimes can be implemented. As
described below, the United States and Ireland provide instructive
examples of how graduated response can effectively become the law

45. IFPI, Digital Music Report 2009: New Business Models for a Changing
Environment, 24 (2009), available at www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009real.pdf.
46. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, RIAA Graduated Response Plan: Q&A With Cary
Sherman, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/
2008/12/riaa-graduated-response-plan-qa-with-cary-sherman.ars (reporting that the
RIAA was essentially abandoning a lawsuit campaign against individual copyright
infringers “in favor of a ‘graduated response’ partnership with ISPs”); Press
Release, Austl. Copyright Council, ISPs and Copyright Owners: Friends or Foes?
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.copyright.org.au/news-and-policy/details /id/1853/
(asserting that “cooperation between copyright owner groups and ISPs is integral
to any graduated response scheme”).
47. See IFPI, Governments Address ISP Cooperation in Tackling Online Piracy
Around the World (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/
library/ISP-progress-March-2009.pdf (enumerating various international “ISP
cooperation” efforts across several countries, most of which involve a graduated
response mechanism or disconnection of service).
48. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 7, art. 27, ¶ 3.
49. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B (explaining cooperative activities between
rights holders and broadband providers in the United States, as illustrated by the
Comcast-NBC Universal merger, and in Ireland, as illustrated by Eircom’s
settlement with EMI, Sony BMG, Universal, and Warner).
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for Internet users without ever becoming the law of the land.50

A. PRIVATELY ORDERED GRADUATED RESPONSE IN THE U.S.
Whereas the entertainment industry’s campaign in Europe and
countries abroad has focused on government-mandated graduated
response, the campaign in the United States has focused on interindustry negotiations and technology-based solutions capable of
private implementation.51 Rights holders in the U.S. market,
believing that the DMCA has failed them as a weapon in the
domestic war on piracy, have set their sights on “an enforcement
regime that operates on Internet users through a combination of
technology and private law mechanisms, such as standardized terms
of service and acceptable use policies.”52
There are a number of reasons why U.S.-based ISPs are now more
receptive to overtures from rights holders than they were in the past.
One such reason is a growing sense among ISPs that they stand to
benefit by agreeing to work more cooperatively with rights holders.
For example, in 2005, Verizon agreed with Disney to forward notices
of infringement to its customers; in return, Verizon gained the right
to transmit Disney programming over its network.53 These types of
business arrangements are likely to become more common as
distribution of non-amateur content over the Internet increases.
Music, movies, and television shows that were once transmitted only
over the air or via cable are now also streamed over the Internet,
meaning that ISPs now mediate the consumption of corporateproduced entertainment in ways they never did before.54 As a result
50. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
51. See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private
Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 82 (2010)
(referencing the Motion Picture Association of America’s request to the Federal
Communications Commission to “step aside and ‘not interpose any legal or
regulatory obstacles’. . . that would prevent rights owners and broadband providers
from working together to implement graduated response”).
52. Id. at 83-84.
53. Nate Anderson, Verizon to Forward RIAA Warning Letters (But That's All),
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 13, 2009, 3:28 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/11/verizon-to-forward-riaa-warning-letters-but-thats-all.ars.
54. See Marc Chacksfield, Online Video Streaming Continues to Rise,
TECHRADAR.COM (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/onlinevideo-streaming-continues-to-rise-664719 (reporting on Neilsen research showing
large year-over-year increases in online viewing of video streams).
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of the rise of streaming media over broadband, traditional lines of
demarcation between corporate content producers and corporate
network operators are blurring. The January 2011 merger between
Comcast and NBC Universal is a prime example of the
transformation now underway in the relationship between the major
corporations that control access to the Internet and the major
corporations that control rights in popular entertainment
programming.55 When owners of the networks over which content is
delivered become holders of the rights in that content, their stake in
the copyright enforcement game radically changes.
ISPs are also increasingly conscious of the extent to which peerto-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing traffic, most of which is attributable to
copyright infringement, causes congestion on their networks. A key
element of the negotiation strategy for rights holders seeking to
partner with U.S. broadband providers in the implementation of a
network-level solution to online piracy is the assertion that
management of P2P traffic should be regarded as a matter of mutual
concern.56 The message has not fallen on deaf ears; Comcast’s highly
controversial use of deep packet inspection technology to effectively
block BitTorrent traffic in 2007 is but one manifestation of the
growing community of interest between rights holders and network
operators.57
55. See Kristen Hamill, U.S. Approves Comcast-NBC Merger, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 18, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/18/technology/
fcc_comcast_nbc/index.htm (reporting that the FCC and Department of Justice
approved the merger, but also imposed upon the parties a number of conditions to
ensure that the merger served the public interest); see also Cecilia Kang, ComcastNBC Universal Merger Gains Support in FCC, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR201012230
4876.html?sid=ST2010122305522 (indicating concerns over the creation of a
“content empire” owned by a service provider, and suggesting that the FCC should
adopt strict, enforceable conditions in order to protect public interests).
56. See Saul Hansell, Hollywood Wants Internet Providers to Block
Copyrighted Files, NY TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/09/25/hollywood-tries-to-get-support-for-having-isps-block-copyrightedfiles/ (reporting on the formation of an inter-industry consortium through which
copyright owners seeking to limit illegal file-sharing and broadband providers
seeking to reduce congestion on their networks will explore and advance their
mutual interest in managing P2P traffic).
57. See Grant Gross, Court Rules Against FCC’s Comcast Net Neutrality
Decision, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS44
396209420100406 (discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
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Given users’ resistance to having their ISPs function as copyright
enforcement agents for the entertainment industry, ISP executives
are cagey when it comes to publicizing the nature of their
cooperative relationships with corporate copyright holders. To
comply with section 512(i) of the DMCA, every major broadband
provider in the United States includes in its terms of use a provision
reserving the right to terminate access for any user who repeatedly
infringes copyrights.58 Representatives of major broadband
providers, including Comcast, Cox, and AT&T, publicly deny that
they are participating in a “three strikes” program in cooperation

Columbia’s decision to overturn a FCC ruling that had prevented Comcast from
implementing network management processes that targeted P2P users); see also
What is BitTorrent?, BITTORRENT.COM, http://www.bittorrent.com/btusers/whatis-bittorrent (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing BitTorrent as an internet
“protocol . . . allowing [users] to download files quickly by allowing people
downloading the file to upload (distribute) parts of it at the same time”).
58. See, e.g., AT&T U-verse Terms of Service, AT&T, Sched. 2, ¶ 5,
http://www.att.com/u-verse/att-terms-of-service.jsp (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(“AT&T . . . may, however, immediately terminate or suspend your Member
Account and Sub Accounts, and all or a portion of your Service without notice if . .
. you . . . engage in conduct that is a violation of any law, regulation or tariff
(including, without limitation, copyright and intellectual property laws) . . . .”).
Comcast expressly reserves the right to terminate or suspend access unilaterally
(i.e., in its “sole discretion”). Comcast Acceptable Use Policy for High-Speed
Internet Services, COMCAST, sec. V, www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/1/1/
Customers/Customer_Support/Legal/Acceptable_Use_Policy_for_Internet.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2011).
It is Comcast's policy in accordance with the DMCA and other applicable laws to
reserve the right to terminate the Service provided to any customer or user who is
either found to infringe third party copyright or other intellectual property rights,
including repeat infringers, or who Comcast, in its sole discretion, believes is
infringing these rights. Comcast may terminate the Service at any time with or without
notice for any affected customer or user.

Id. Verizon’s terms are nearly identical to Comcast’s. Verizon Online Terms of
Service, VERIZON, Attachment A, ¶ 3 http://www.verizon.net/policies/popups/
tos_popup.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
In accordance with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and other
applicable laws, it is the policy of Verizon to suspend or terminate, in appropriate
circumstances, the Service provided to any subscriber or account holder who is
deemed to infringe third party intellectual property rights, including repeat infringers
of copyrights. In addition, Verizon expressly reserves the right to suspend, terminate
or take other interim action regarding the Service of any Subscriber or account holder
if Verizon, in its sole judgment, believes that circumstances relating to an infringement
of third party intellectual property rights warrant such action.

Id.
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with the RIAA.59 At the same time, however, Comcast executive Joe
Waz disclosed that the company issues between a million and two
million infringement notices per year to subscribers on behalf of
copyright holders.60 A Cox spokesperson acknowledged that Cox has
sent out hundreds of thousands of warnings and has suspended the
accounts of a small number of users in connection with the
company’s DMCA compliance efforts.61
Although the impulse of broadband executives is to deny
involvement when they are confronted with questions from the
media about “three strikes” and graduated response,62 the fact of the
matter is that U.S. broadband providers have engaged for a number
of years in a form of graduated response in the name of DMCA
compliance. They have entered into arrangements with rights holders
requiring them to forward infringement notices to subscribers, and at
least one major ISP—Cox—is on the record as having suspended
access for subscribers who routinely receive and ignore such
notices.63 Such suspensions, which occur without a court order or a
judgment of infringement, are permitted under the terms of use to
which all subscribers must agree before obtaining broadband
service.64 Although it is impossible to gauge with any accuracy the
extent to which U.S. ISPs are currently cooperating with rights
holders in online copyright enforcement, they could be doing so
quite extensively without any required disclosure and without
59. See Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Others Deny ‘Three Strikes’ Piracy Plan,
PCMAG.COM (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,23439
77,00.asp.
60. Id.
61. See id. (claiming than less than 0.1% of Cox accounts that received notices
were suspended); Sarah McBride, Relationship Status of RIAA and ISPs: It’s
Complicated, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009, 3:07 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/03/26/relationship-status-of-riaa-and-isps-itscomplicated/ (reporting that Cox suspends an account only when the user ignores
“numerous communications” about infringing material).
62. See David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA 3-Strikes Plan,
WIRED (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-verizon-o/
(“Two weeks after the [RIAA] announced it had struck deals with top internet
service providers to cut off unrepentant music sharers, not a single major ISP will
cop to agreeing to the ambitious scheme, and one top broadband company says it’s
not on board.”).
63. Albanesius, supra note 59; McBride, supra note 61.
64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (indicating that AT&T, Comcast,
and Cox all have these provisions in their user agreements).
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running afoul of their existing contractual agreements with
customers.

B. PRIVATELY ORDERED GRADUATED RESPONSE IN IRELAND
Ireland provides another example of privately ordered online
copyright enforcement. Graduated response became the de facto law
for over forty percent of that country’s broadband subscribers after a
major ISP—Eircom—settled claims of copyright infringement
brought against it by major music and movie distributors (EMI, Sony
BMG, Universal, and Warner).65 After an eight day trial, the parties
agreed to a settlement that required Eircom to implement a “three
strikes” graduated response protocol.66 The case never went to
judgment on the merits, so there is no law “on the books” as a result
of it, yet the settlement has demonstrable public law effects.
The “three strikes” protocol adopted in the Eircom case is
described in detail in an Irish High Court decision issued in the
context of an unsuccessful legal challenge to the settlement.67 Upon
receiving a first notice of infringement from a computer security firm
hired by the plaintiffs, Eircom informs its allegedly infringing
customer that s/he has been caught in the act of illegal uploading or
downloading.68 This first warning is included with the customer’s
monthly bill.69 Upon receipt of a second notice of infringement by
the same customer, Eircom sends a separate letter to the customer
that contains a strongly worded warning.70 The response escalates
from the first level to the second level only if fourteen days or more
have passed since the first infringement was detected.71 Upon receipt
of a third notice concerning the same customer, Eircom must review
all of the evidence against the customer. As with the escalation from
the first level of response to the second, fourteen days or more must
pass before the response can graduate to the third level.72 The first
two notices are generated automatically; the third notice, however,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

EMI Records v. Eircom Ltd., [2010] IEHC 108 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
See EMI Records, [2010] IEHC 108, ¶¶ 2, 9.
See generally EMI Records, [2010] IEHC 108, ¶¶ 9-13.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 13.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
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triggers a human review. Following human review, a notice of
termination is sent to the customer, who is given fourteen days to
respond.73 Eircom considers the response, if any is received, in light
of any extenuating circumstances the customer raises. If the customer
claims in his or her response that there was a mistake of fact
concerning the alleged infringements, Eircom considers that claim as
well.74 If Eircom does not find in favor of the customer, the
customer’s Internet service is cut off. No court order is required; the
ISP is the sole arbiter of the customer’s innocence or guilt.75
The EMI-Eircom settlement has effectively made graduated
response the law for over half a million Irish citizens entirely outside
the parliamentary process. And unlike in France, where opposition to
the HADOPI legislation in its initial form resulted in amendments
designed to ensure judicial review of disconnection decisions,
Eircom’s subscribers have no such guarantee. In this respect,
privately designed and implemented graduated response regimes are
even more problematic, from the point of view of consumer
protection, than publicly implemented ones.

CONCLUSION
At the close of the official negotiations, looking back on the
round-by-round evolution of ACTA’s terms, it seems safe to say that
the Internet provisions were among the agreement’s most contested
and heavily negotiated. References to repeat infringers and account
termination were edited out of the agreement well before the final
round of negotiations, and with them went the prospect of mandatory
graduated response. Related provisions requiring secondary liability
for ISPs and a DMCA-like safe harbor framework also fell away,
albeit later in the game.
Before breathing a sigh of relief, however, opponents of graduated
response should think twice about the possible implications of the
provision in the final version of ACTA that requires governments to
“endeavor to promote cooperative efforts” between rights holders

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. ¶¶ 14-15 (characterizing the settlement protocol as consistent with
Eircom’s terms of service regarding the suspension or termination of accounts).
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and ISPs.76 Through this amorphous provision, ISPs might be subject
to various forms of government pressure encouraging them to
capitulate to copyright holders’ demands for privately implemented
graduated response regimes. For lawmakers who would rather not
place themselves at the center of the controversy over graduated
response, private ordering with a government push may prove more
palatable than outright government mandates, which prompted very
vocal public resistance in places like France and the U.K.77 Like the
negotiation of ACTA itself, state-promoted private ordering
represents a species of policymaking that is insulated from public
scrutiny and that can be tailored, by virtue of that insulation, to serve
corporate interests at the public’s expense.

76. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 7, art. 27, ¶ 3.
77. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, France Reintroduces Three-Strikes Law, Clashes
With EU Likely, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 29, 2009, 1:31 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/news/2009/04/france-reintroduces-three-strikes-law-as-protestsmount.ars (discussing the response to the Création et Internet bill in France, where
citizens formed groups to protest the bill); Nate Anderson, Three-Strikes Petition
Gets Attention of 10 Downing Street, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 26, 2010, 12:52),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/02/uk-govt-agrees-with-3-strikesproportionality-concernsthree-strikes-petition-gets-attention-of-10-downingstreet.ars (referencing a public petition opposing graduated response provisions in
the Digital Economy bill).

